Francis Ruan

The trend / Deal note

P&G / Thorne

Announced August 4, 2026$3.8bn reported~5.8x 2026E revenuePerella Weinberg advised Thorne

Seven times the price of the deal four weeks later. I wanted to know what the extra six turns were buying, and the answer is not in the bottle.

From public sources.
BuyerThe Procter & Gamble Company (NYSE: PG)
SellerL Catterton, Flagship Fund
Reported consideration$3.8bn
Revenue, 2025Over $500m
Revenue, 2026E~$650m
Implied multiple~5.8x forward revenue
Sponsor entry, Oct 2023$680m, $10.20 per share, cash
Entry premium94% to unaffected close, July 20, 2023
Expected closeLater in 2026

What actually changed hands

P&G already sells supplements. Metamucil, Align, New Chapter. Those brands win on shelf position, freight and price, and P&G is world-class at all three.

Thorne wins on none of them. It got its start in clinics, with practitioners who put their own reputation behind a recommendation, and only later went at consumers directly. That order of operations is the whole asset. You cannot buy into it and you cannot rebuild it once it is spent.

Why the seller took the exit

L Catterton took Thorne private in October 2023 for roughly $680m at $10.20 a share, a 94% premium to the undisturbed price. Handing it to a strategic three years later is a clean result and it dodges the risk of a second sponsor sale or a re-IPO in a category where sentiment turns fast.

One thing I will not do is quote you a return. The $680m was an equity take-private value and the $3.8bn is a reported headline. Without the capital structure at both dates, any multiple of money I gave you would be a guess wearing a suit.

Does 5.8x survive contact

Thorne did over $500m in 2025 and is tracked near $650m for 2026. Call it 30% growth. At $3.8bn that is a growth-asset price, not a bolt-on price, which means the multiple is not asking whether Thorne is good. It is asking whether Thorne keeps compounding near 30% inside a company built for a completely different kind of brand.

  • Brand dilution, which erodes quietly and is only obvious once it is done.
  • Growth dependence, because at 5.8x there is almost no room to slow down.
  • Claims and labeling scrutiny, where a mass-market owner is a much bigger target.
  • The practitioner who recommended Thorne may feel differently about a P&G brand.

My call

Not an overpayment. A bet on distribution discipline, which is historically the thing large acquirers of premium brands are worst at. The first thing I would diligence is P&G’s plan for holding the practitioner channel while it expands retail, because that channel is the entire 5.8x.

Sources

If you have a better read on this one, I would like to hear it. fyruan@usc.edu